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Book Summary of A Conversation On Peacemaking With Jimmy Carter by National Institute for Dispute Resolution
Citation: National Institute for Dispute Resolution. A Conversation On Peacemaking With Jimmy Carter. Washington, DC: National Institute for Dispute Resolution, 1992.
This Book Summary written by: Tanya Glaser, Conflict Research Consortium
The conversation between former President Jimmy Carter and James Laue, Lynch Professor
of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University on peacemaking, took place during the
fifth National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution in Charlotte, North
Carolina on June 7, 1991.
Camp David: Stories and Lessons
The first topic of the discussion was Camp David negotiations. President Carter
described the preparation, relationships that developed between him and the parties and
between the parties, and the turning points during the process. Sadat, the Egyptian
President, was his very close friend and had the biggest commitment to the peace process.
Begin, Israeli Prime Minister, was the most resistant within the Israeli delegation. Camp
David was a perfect environment for those leaders to meet: it was a relatively small
isolated place where they had to share the same swimming pool and tennis courts, which was
very unusual for representatives of these two antagonistic countries. Prior to
negotiations, President Carter carefully studied the psychological profiles of the two
leaders prepared by the US national security staff. Soon after the beginning of the talks,
it became obvious that the two leaders were not ready to face each other directly; their
views were too incompatible. While they spent the first three days working with Jimmy
Carter in a small room in his cabin, for the last ten days the two leaders did not see
each other at all. Negotiations took on a form of indirect mediation. After a single
document was created, Jimmy Carter spent time with each of the leaders separately on
revising the document. Public support for peace in Israel played a large role in Begin's
decision to sign the final proposal. The Camp David Accords established a framework for a
peace treaty negotiated in six months.
Asked to describe a turning point in the negotiations, Carter presented the following
example. The issue which almost ruined the peace process was dismantling of the Israeli
settlements. Begin took an oath that he would never allow dismantling of the settlements.
He was firm and decided to withdraw from the talks. Before leaving Camp David, he asked
Jimmy Carter to sign eight photographs for his grandchildren. The photographs depicted
him, Carter and Sadat. Carter addressed his autographs personally to each of Begin's
grandchildren and took the pictures to Begin. Begin was very touched, and agreed to
proceed with negotiations. A compromise on the issue of settlements was found: the Knesse
(the Israeli parliament), would vote on it. Later the Knesse approved dismantling.
(However, the leaders of the Likud coalition did not support the decision and they later
came to power in Israel.) Jimmy Carter concluded that successful negotiations involve
personal and emotional elements and demand creative approaches in finding ways out of
stalemates.
The Middle East Today
The next topic was the current situation in the Middle East. President Carter praised
the attempts of Secretary Baker to arrange a meeting between the two sides, especially
considering the absence of the efforts in this direction for the last ten years. President
Carter emphasized the need for the US to exercise its influence on all the parties
continuously if we want peace in this region. The situation is complicated by the parties'
firm positions on certain issues, like unwillingness of the Israeli leaders, most of whom
belong to the Likud coalition, to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. The Camp David
Accords promised full autonomy to Palestinians living on these territories, but this
promise has never been implemented. To de-escalate the conflict both parties could make
practical steps in trust building. For example, the PLO could abandon those parts of its
charter that argue for destruction of Israel, and could disavow violent means of struggle.
Thus, there are ways for both sides to gradually build up trustful relationships. The
problem is that there is not enough desire on the part of the leaders to work toward
peace.
Due to the process of democratization taking place in the Soviet Union, Israel has
improved its relationships not just with the US but with the USSR as well. President Assad
of Syria expressed his willingness to have direct negotiations with Israel on the issue of
the Golan Heights. Thus, the international situation is improving, which gives a good
perspective for the future. President Carter identified two issues that need to be
clarified before arranging negotiations: the role of the US at an international conference
and the length of the bilateral discussion deadlock before the parties can ask for the
instructions and assistance from the plenum groups. Arabs and Israelis have opposing
opinions on both of these issues.
The Carter Center and the International Negotiation Network
President Carter identified three general rules of the work of the Carter Center: (1)
not to duplicate the activities of other organizations; (2) to maintain non-political
approach to projects; (3) to combine scientific analysis with practical implementation.
President Carter outlined major programs of the Carter Center. They can be subdivided
into several categories. "Nutrition and health projects" constitute the Center's
humanitarian activity (p. 6). For example, the Center has helped to "increase food
production" in Africa (p. 6). One of its major projects is directed toward disease
eradication through immunization.
The second direction of work is conflict resolution. The fact is that the most violent
conflicts in the world are civil wars. For political reasons, international organizations
like the UN as well as individual countries cannot become involved in those internal
conflicts. The Carter Center and its Negotiation Network which includes George Mason
University, Harvard, Uppsala and the World Conference on Religion and Peace tries to fill
this gap. It makes those conflicts and their causalities known to the world and attempts
to mediate them.
Specialists from the Center learned about an alternative to negotiation or
mediation--elections. They assisted in conducting elections in Panama, Nicaragua, etc.
President Carter talked about some of his interventions. In Ethiopia he met with Mengistu
(the country's president at that time) and two revolutionary groups, Tigerean and
Eritrean. As a result of those meetings the parties agreed to meet for peace talks. The
situation changed later; Mengistu was no longer in office. President Carter believed that
elections could restart the peace process.
In Sudan, through the Center's wheat production program, President Carter gained access
to the government circle and he also met with the head of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement. In Panama, American diplomats were not allowed to communicate with Panamian
government after it stopped supporting the Contras. The Carter Center was not under such
restrictions and, invited by Noriega, conducted the elections there. Interestingly, in
Panama, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, where the Carter Center was asked by the
government to assist in elections, the inviting government lost the elections. President
Carter concluded that conducting elections became a new way of dealing with conflicts.
Lessons about Peacemaking
President Carter identified several lessons of his peace-making experience. (1) There
is a need to communicate with both parties. Organizations such as the UN cannot conduct
negotiations with revolutionaries when the government of the country is a UN member. (2)
Public announcements on the negotiation process should be joint. (In Ethiopia, Eritreans
came with the initiative to start peace talks with the Mengistu government. But after
Mengistu agreed with this proposal, his parliament made a statement that it was the
government that initiated the peace talks.) (3) The role of the mediators should be
clearly defined. (4) The negotiation process should be confidential and there should be no
press involved. This was one of the reasons for the success of the Camp David
negotiations. (5) Negotiations should have a time limit. (6) Prior to negotiations, the
mediator should prepare a document stating all the points on which the parties agree. (7)
Negotiators care a lot about public opinion of their decisions. During the Camp David
negotiations, public opinion polls were run every four days in Israel. This way, when
Begin expressed concern about public opinion of his decisions, Carter had results of the
polls on these issues. (8) After the agreement is reached, the implementation process
should be clear and convincing. In Sinai, for example, the presence of UN observers gave
more weight to the agreement. The US promised two billion dollars to pay to move
"Israeli airfields out of Egyptian territory" (p. 10).
Questions from Conference Participants
President Carter commented on the role of third world exploitation by corporations in
kindling conflicts. He identified several conflict causes: ethnic hatred, human rights
abuses by an oppressor, and deterioration of living standards. The latter cause is often
the result of the actions of American corporations. Those actions create distrust toward
Americans, even those who try to make a positive change in third world countries.
Some Advice for Peacemakers
President Carter appealed to conflict resolution practitioners to publicize their work,
to make more people aware of the resources available to them in constructive conflict
management.
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